Much of the Indian budget is focused on the army, with the air force being a distant second and the navy a poor third.
By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
India has been trying hard to enhance its naval capabilities over the
past few years, both in recognition of its own needs as well as an
understanding of evolving trends in the strategic environment. But
despite New Delhi’s best efforts, doing so continues to be slow work.
A
case in point is India’s submarine programme, which was in the
spotlight again recently when the second of the Indian Navy’s six
Scorpene submarines, INS Khanderi, was inducted into service on 28
September. The first Scorpene submarine, called INS Kalvari, was
commissioned in 2017. The third submarine, INS Karanj, launched in
January 2018, is undertaking sea trials now. INS Khanderi was
manufactured by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited at a cost of ₹187.98
billion (about $2.6 billion) under an India-France bilateral agreement
in 2005 to build six Scorpene class submarines in India. Not including
the Scorpenes, India currently has two other older types of
diesel-electric submarine types, the Sindhughosh (Kilo) class and the
Shishumar (HDW 209/1500) class diesel-electric submarines, and the
nuclear-powered Arihant class (as well as the leased Chakra class
nuclear submarine).
But the induction of the new
submarine belies the fact that the size of India’s submarine inventory
has been declining for years. The Scorpene acquisition has undergone
significant delays — more than six years — even though it remains an
important addition to the Indian naval capability. Even though there
have been triumphant comments from many senior Indian officials on the
significance of this induction, it is far from sufficient given the
growing naval and maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
Commissioning the submarine into service, the Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh talked
of the importance of the submarine and Indo-French defence cooperation,
though he framed the acquisition primarily as a message to Pakistan.
But the Scorpene submarines still do not have a modern torpedo, making do with the older SUT torpedoes. India cancelled
a deal for the heavy-weight Black Shark torpedoes, built by the
Finmecannica subsidiary WASS, as a result of an unrelated corruption
scandal that involved another subsidiary of Finmecannica,
Augusta-Westland. In a makeshift arrangement, the Indian government
approached the German defence company, Atlas Elektronik to upgrade 64 torpedoes, which were procured in the 1980s
and 1990s for the Indian Navy’s four Shishumar-class submarines. The
already-insufficient number of torpedoes in the Indian Navy’s arsenal is
to be now also shared with the Scorpene submarines.
An additional issue comes from the slow development of the air independent propulsion
(AIP) system. AIP allows submarines to stay under water for longer
periods of time without being detected. However, the development of the
indigenous AIP system by Defense Research and Development Organization
(DRDO) has been delayed, which should not come as much of a surprise
given the history of DRDO’s tendency to over-promise and under-deliver.
The last two of the Scorpene submarines were to be equipped with the
indigenously developed AIP systems but because of the delay by the DRDO,
the plan is now to have them in the next six submarines that will be
developed under Project 75I.
But Project 75I has also been
very slow. Under Project 75I, India plans to build six additional
advanced conventional submarines in collaboration with a foreign
manufacturer. But this has also run into difficulties. The Swedish
defence firm SAAB, which was seen as one of the top foreign contenders,
pulled out its bid because of onerous conditions the India has imposed
regarding indigenous partnerships and instead South Korea’s Daewoo
Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering has entered the fray.
The South Korean decision possibly flows out of the visit of the Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to South Korea
in September where defence industry cooperation was a major highlight.
South Korea joins four other contenders: Naval Group (France), Navantia
(Spain), Rosoboronexport (Russia) and TKMS (Germany) who are all bidding
for the ₹450 billion (about $6.32 billion) contract. During the recent
visit of Prime Minister Modi to Russia, the Russian President Vladimir
Putin agreed to undertake a “joint design and development of
conventional submarines through an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA).”
But it has been more than a decade since Project 75I started, and it
will be years more before these submarines enter Indian Navy service.
The
long, hard work of building up India’s naval capabilities is not just
limited to its submarine programme. On the same day as the INS Khanderi
induction, there were two other developments that are critical to the
Indian Navy: the launching of the first of the P17A frigates, ‘Nilgiri’
and inauguration of a dry dock, located within the Naval Dockyard in Mumbai. According to Rakesh Anand, head of Mazagon Dock Limited, the new frigates come with “new design concepts for improved survivability, sea keeping, stealth and ship manoeuvrability.” The new dry dock
will be the Indian Navy’s biggest one, capable of holding India’s
aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya. It is state of the art, made of 1.5
meter-thick reinforced concrete and almost 300 meters into the sea. But
it has taken more than a decade to complete the dock.
The slow
nature of India’s naval buildup is the product of broader trends that
are well-known. Much of the Indian budget is focused on the Army, with
the air force being a distant second and the navy a poor third. And with
naval capability building proving time-consuming and capital-intensive,
that leaves New Delhi stuck with a continued slow pace of development
of its naval capabilities relative to other actors, even as competitors
such as China forge ahead more quickly.
The solutions are also
well-known. Some of them involve process: for instance, India needs to
change its decision-making processes and its complicated acquisitions
process to halt the slide in its relative capabilities. Others relate to
outlook, with India needing to focus on the right threats to its
national security rather than leaving itself looking broad but being
overextended as a result. Whether or not these solutions will be adopted
or not remains to be seen. Until then, developing India’s naval
capabilities will likely continue to prove to be slow work irrespective
of the incremental gains that are seen in the headlines.
This article originally appeared in The Diplomat.
The post The Trouble With India’s Slow Naval Buildup – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.
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